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Introduction
The liberation of Europe started with Stalingrad and the landing in Italy in the Summer 
of 1943. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had not originally 
prepared the partition of Europe into spheres of interest. From the Autumn of 1943 
onwards, by establishing an European Advisory Committee (EAC) in London, by 
jointly formulating armistice terms, and by setting up the Allied Control Commissions 
for Italy, then for Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary, they made an attempt to 
agree on a common policy. In October 1944, the British recognised the military 
dominance of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, but in their view this did not imply 
the introduction of Soviet-type systems.
The agreement between Churchill and Stalin on the division by percentage of war­
time influence was an interim arrangement of military character for participation in the 
Allied Control Commissions, a compromise which in practice was ended with the three- 
power conference at Yalta - although the parties abided by the bargain later as well. The 
aim defined in the declaration of the 11th of February 1945 on liberated Europe was not 
division into spheres of interest but political coordination among the three powers, the 
establishing of democratic institutions and the restoration of lost sovereignty, with a 
view to forming provisional governments comprising all democratic parties. This was to 
be followed by free elections and stable governments in harmony with the will of the 
people.
The victorious powers considered three-power cooperation indispensable not only 
to the conduct of the war, but to a peace settlement and to the drafting of peace treaties 
as well. National governments implied coalitions uniting all anti-fascist forces in the 
East European countries. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union believed that such 
democratic multi-party systems would survive for about ten to fifteen years. Soviet 
strategic dominance in Eastern Europe and the priority of Soviet security interests were 
recognised by the British in the Autumn of 1944, by the Americans at the Foreign 
Minister’s Conference in Moscow in December 1945. This came after the Soviets had 
conceded the priority of the Western Allies in Italy in the Spring of 1944, and in Japan 
by the Autumn of 1945.
Conflicts between the Great Powers arose from the fact that they were unable to 
map out a common European policy. The strength of the anti-fascist coalition proved 
sufficient to ensure peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland 
before the end of 1946, but great-power cooperation broke down in the discussion of the 
central problems -  the treaties with Germany and Austria.
The Soviet government’s interests in the territories that were brought under military 
control was different. It did not tolerate any meddling by the U.K. or the U.S. with regard 
to the creation of governments and communist dominance in the domestic affairs of
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Poland, Rumania or Bulgaria. Indeed, the control of these territories gave the Soviet 
Union access to the heart of Germany and the Mediterranean. Elections were held in the 
Autumn of 1946 or the Spring of 1947, but the struggle in these countries was decided 
in advance by election fraud and police interference, by the ousting of opposition parties 
from political life, by exploiting the Soviet military presence, and (in the case of 
Rumania) by means of reparations.
The British -- and later the Americans -  put up with the existence of security zones 
that differed from their 1943 ideas, but they did not accept the principle of exclusive 
Soviet influence. In their interpretation, influence might be wielded by the West in 
Eastern Europe and by the Soviets in Westem Europe. With regards to the main strategic 
lines, however, the Soviets interpreted influence in accordance with the precedent 
established in 1943 by the Westem Allies in Italy.
In the Autunm of 1945 and the Spring of 1946, three countries -- of minor strategic 
importance to the Soviet Union — Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were able to 
hold free elections; the communist parties of the first two countries did very badly. Until 
the end of 1946 and early 1947, Stalin did not consider communist dominance to be 
important, rather he wanted the governing parties in those countries to pursue friendship 
towards the Soviet Union. At that time, the presence of Soviet troops was not crucial. 
They withdrew from Czechoslovakia in December 1945 and from Bulgaria towards the 
end of 1947. Moreover, troop withdrawals from Austria and Hungary were also under 
consideration during preparations for an Austrian Peace Treaty in early 1947.
Soviet foreign policy between 1943 and 1947 relied on the allied Slav states; 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland. It centred around a possible future German 
threat. The Moscow agreement of December 1943 between Stalin and Benes served as 
a model for pacts of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Accession to this 
alliance was made possible for the defeated states (Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary) by 
bilateral agreements with Moscow and with one another in 1948.
The territorial status of the Soviet Union’s prospective allies, the limitation of their 
military and economic sovereignty were regulated, in addition to bilateral arrangements, 
by the peace treaties agreed to by the British and American governments. Defeated 
Rumania lost Bessarabia, Northem Bukovina and the Southern Dobrogea, but was 
allowed to regain Northem Transylvania; the frontiers drawn up at Trianon in 1920 
remained valid for Hungary — with the loss of an additional three villages on the right 
bank of the Danube which formed a Czechoslovak bridgehead at Pozsony (Bratislava- 
Pressburg). On the other hand, Bulgaria — which had been a Nazi satellite - increased her 
territory after the war. Through the recognition of the continued validity of the 
Rumanian-Bulgarian agreement of Craiova (7th of September 1940), it could retain 
Southem Dobrogea.
But no fairer treatment was extended to the countries allied to the Soviet Union. 
Poland received German temtory in compensation for the parts ceded to the Soviet 
Union, but Czechoslovakia -  another victor -  was compelled in June 1945 to yield the 
Carpathian Ukraine to the Soviet Union. Thus a Soviet-Hungarian frontier came into 
existence. The strength of the armed forces of the defeated countries was limited; Soviet
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troops were stationed in Rumania and Hungary in order to maintain lines of 
communication with the Soviet zone in Austria; the two countries paid $ 300 million 
each in reparations. Germans were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well 
as, from Hungary, and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.
The post-war new democratic start was coupled with landslide changes and huge 
movements of populations. The Central and Southeast European democratic systems 
came into being in keeping with the intentions of the Great Powers; the decisive role in 
their birth was played by the Soviet Union since the countries concerned -- except 
Yugoslavia — had not themselves forced the German army out of their territory. When 
negotiating over Hungary in December 1945, Stalin told U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes 
that “the Soviet Union could do pretty much what it wanted there;” yet elections were 
not won by the Communists but by another party. This proved true for the whole region. 
The Soviet Prime Minister was of the opinion that to maintain the three-power alliance, 
the Soviet Union had exercised moderation or applied a self denying device by 
accepting multi-party systems and free elections, since it could have introduced a Soviet 
system immediately after the occupation of Eastem Europe.
The war-time alliance had definitively come to an end by the Spring of 1947 when 
negotiations over a German peace treaty ended in failure; this eliminated any 
considerations that might have moderated Soviet policy in Eastem Europe. The 
consequences are well-known. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were 
followed by Cominform. Democracy in Czechoslovakia and Hungary was suppressed 
in 1948; Eastem Europe introduced a Soviet-type system, and all states (except 
Yugoslavia) became part of the Soviet alliance.
The Council of Foreign Ministers
At the end of the war, the allied Great Powers did not yet have any complete and jointly 
accepted plan for the elimination of armistice regimes and European settlement. The 
preconditions, the principles of procedure, the order of discussions and even the scope 
of the drafting powers were determined after long diplomatic battles between the three 
powers. It was in the course of these debates that the parties agreed upon the nature of 
the treaties, the venues and dates of the peace talks and above all, they took important 
decisions on restoring sovereignty and designating the final political frontiers of the 
defeated states.
The first agreement reached at the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference between the heads 
of states and govemments of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain was 
about the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers that represented the five 
great powers:
“As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with 
a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial 
questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be
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U tilised  fo r  th e  p re p a ra tio n  o f  a  p e a c e  se ttle m e n t fo r  G e rm a n y  w h e n  a  g o v e rn m e n t
adequate for the purpose is established.” ’
The principles of procedure and the order of the five peace treaties agreed upon played 
a decisive role in the drafting of the peace treaties.
It was believed that the five peace treaties could be finished within months. Since, 
however, there was no adequate German government to conclude the peace treaty, the 
solution of the central issue of a European settlement had to be postponed, until the 
conclusion of the Final Settlement (and not a peace treaty) with Germany on September 
12,1990.
The three governments attending the Berlin Conference considered it their primary 
task to prepare the Italian Peace Treaty. Due to order of discussions of the five peace 
treaties adopted by the Berlin Conference -  Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland
-  the Italian question enjoyed priority while among the so-called Balkan Peace Treaties 
(Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian), the Rumanian Peace Treaty had been given priority. 
The fact that the cases of Italy and the other “ex-enemy” states had been linked with each 
other at the Berlin Conference was the result of Soviet diplomacy. Despite their different 
war records, the above countries had been given uniform judgment and their “unsettled 
situations” were to be settied at the same time.
The Berlin Conference specified the concrete circle of the states to draft the peace 
frontier. “For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the 
Members representing those states which were signatory to the terms of surrender 
imposed upon the enemy state concerned. For the purposes of the peace settiement for 
Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other 
members will be invited to participate when matters directiy concerning them are under 
discussion.”^
The Peace Treaty for Italy had been drafted by the British, American, Soviet and 
French Foreign Ministers; the Peace Treaty for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the 
Soviet, American and British, and the peace treaty for Finland by the Soviet and British 
Foreign Ministers. In Paris, at the Second Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
(April 25,1946), this ruling was modified. France took part in the negotiations of the 
Balkan treaties, though in practice confined her participation to suggestions and advice.
The Peace Aims of the Great Powers in 1945
Foreign Secretary Eden summarised the British-Soviet debates on Balkan issues to 
Churchill as early as May 25,1945. Eden stated that “our aim in Rumania, Bulgaria and 
Hungary was to secure their evacuation by the Red Army and the establishment of 
independent governments.”^  The Foreign Office proposed the early conclusion of peace
* Foreign Relations o f the United States Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin 1945, hereafter F/?£/5 
1945, The Conference of Berlin U. p. 1500.
 ^FRVS1945. The Conference of Berlin II. p. 1500.
 ^L. Woodward, History of British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. in., London, 1961, pp. 58-78.
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treaties with the three countries concerned. An office meeting was held on the 7th of 
June to consider arrangements necessary for the negotiations of peace treaties with 
Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. It was thought that the Russians would inevitably 
demand the right to maintain military bases and troops in the countries concerned. The 
question arose whether it would be appropriate that positions to this effect should be 
included in the treaties. It was pointed out that if the British argued against their 
inclusion, the Russians would have no difficulty in securing any terms they wanted in 
bilateral agreements. It, therefore, appeared be more satisfactory from the Foreign 
Office point of view that the matter should be regulated in the peace treaties, since 
Britain should then at least know what concessions the Russians secured and would 
have some locus standi for displaying an interest in the matter.
There was some discussion of the relevance of this question to the intention of 
British military to maintain military installations in Italy. According to the Foreign 
Office meeting view “there could be no question of foregoing any advantage we might 
secure in Italy in the faint hope that this would induce the Russians to be less exacting in 
their demands on the Balkan countries concerned, but it was felt that in our Italian 
negotiations we should at least bear in mind the importance of avoiding, where possible, 
precedents which the Russians could quote as justifying their continued military control 
of the Balkan.”'*
By June 1945, the U.S. State Department insisted on the reorganisation of 
Rumanian and Bulgarian governments and free election as early as possible. These were 
prerequisites for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of 
peace treaties. The United States supported with reservation the British proposal for the 
early conclusion of peace. They refused to conclude peace with the Rumanian and 
Bulgarian governments in office, even if this step accelerated the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops. After consulting the U.S. representatives in Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, the 
State Department did not even believe that “conclusion of peace would necessarily 
result in withdrawal of Russian troops, especially if real political authority remains in 
the hands of communists.”^
The State Department’s “general approach to the peace treaties with Rumania, 
Bulgaria and Hungary” (a document written immediately after the Potsdam Conference) 
wanted to avoid a punitive peace settlement. The Americans believed that “war guilt” 
clauses, unjustified territorial amputations and undue military, political or economic 
restrictions would not be included in the treaties. It was hoped by this policy to avoid the 
division of the Central European and Balkan region into irreconcilable groups of “status 
quo” and “revisionist” states, which was one of the consequences of the last peace 
settlement, that explains why Southeastern Europe fell so easily under German 
domination. The State Department believed “that general security in the Danubian-
 ^Foreign Office (Public Record Office - PROFO) 371.48192R 10059. Contains a summary of the Debate 
in the British Foreign Office on June 7,1945.
*F0.371.48192R 10742,10766,10768/81/67 11658/5063/67 The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. I
p. 381, pp. 399-400.
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Balkan area can be better secured by the United Nations Organisation and by regional 
arrangements which are in conformity with the United Nations Charter than by specific 
treaty restrictions on the military establishments or on the industries of the ex-satellite 
states,”^
The Soviet revealed their military peace aims concerning Rumania, Bulgaria and 
Hungary at the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London on September
11, 1945. Molotov insisted on discussing the draft peace treaties concerning Finland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania “as one and the same question”.^  The Council of 
Foreign Ministers accepted in the case of Italy the British-American draft peace treaty 
as a basis of negotiations. For the other cases (Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Finland), in turn, the Soviet draft was used to serve this purpose. This indicates the 
decisive role played in the peace setdement by the great power(s), who dictated the 
document of capitulation, and controlled the armistice. Under the Soviet proposal, the 
text of the armistices served as a basis for the peace treaties. Apart from a general 
disarmament clause, the Soviets avoided to discuss the withdrawal of Allied (Soviet) 
troops and to detail the limitation of Balkan land, sea and air forces!
The delegation of Great-Britain submitted its proposals for a peace treaty with 
Rumania and Bulgaria on September 17,1945 and with Hungary on the next day.
The United Kingdom delegation agreed with the Soviet delegation that the relevant 
articles of the Armistice with Rumania (and Hungary) signed at Moscow provided a 
basis for the drafting of certain parts of the treaty of peace with Rumania (and Hungary), 
and assumed “that on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty all Allied Forces will be 
withdrawn from Rumania (and Hungary) (except as may be provided for the 
maintenance of the lines of communication of the Red Army with the Soviet zone of 
occupation in Austria).”*
Oddly enough, it was the British delegation which proposed the formula of 
stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania until the conclusion of Austrian 
State Treaty. (The Soviet troops remained, in fact, on Rumanian soil until July 1958, and 
in Hungary until June 1991). The British delegation proposed that the Peace Treaties 
should lay down the character and numbers of the armed forces which the Balkan States 
would be allowed to retain; should impose the necessary limitations upon the 
manufacture of war material in these states; and should provide for a small inter-Allied 
military inspectorate to supervise the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty in 
succession to the Allied Control Commission, which would be dissolved upon the entry 
into force of the Treaty.
The American delegation “suggested a directive to the deputies from the Council of 
Foreign Ministers to govern them in the drafting of a treaty of peace” with Rumania and 
Bulgaria submitted on September 19, 1945. On September 21, 1945 concerning 
Hungary, “the maintenance of armaments for land, sea and air will be closely restricted 
to the necessities of: (a) maintenance of order in Hungarian territory, (b) local frontier
 ^Steven Kert6sz, The last European peace conference, Paris 1946, University Press of America, 1985, p. 70. 
’ FRUS1945, The Conference of BerUn II. pp. 112-1.
* Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) (45)21 and (45)24.
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defence, (c) such military contingents, if any, in addition to the foregoing as may be 
required by the Security Council.”^
The Council of Foreign Ministers debated the Rumanian draft on September 20, 
1945. Molotov said that unlike Italy, Rumania was not a great power and had only fought 
against the Soviet Union. Rumania was not capable of maintaining a large army or a war- 
making potential which might threaten the peace of Europe. “Why then was it necessary 
to impose special restrictions on Rumania’s military establishment? To restrict her 
armaments and still more, to impose on her an Allied inspectorate, would restrict her 
sovereignty and hurt her pride, without bringing any special benefit to the Allied cause.”‘° 
Bevin insisted on the establishment of an Allied inspectorate as a peace 
enforcement machinery and proposed that the smaller states should not be allowed to 
maintain armed forces larger than their economy could support. The sale of arms to 
small countries was also a potential source of danger. “Limitations of the armaments of 
the smaller powers would not only assist the national economy in those countries, but 
would limit the possibilities of another world war.””
Byrnes feared rivalry in armaments among the small nations, which would 
eventually lead to larger conflicts in which millions might be involved “Limitation of 
armaments would be the greatest boom to the Balkan peoples, whose economic 
condition was such that they could not maintain large armies and the same time restore 
the peace-time production which was essential to their economic health and happiness. 
If the great powers fulfilled their promise to prevent aggression through the United 
Nations Organisation, these countries would have no need of large armies.”*^
After this discussion, the Council agreed that the American proposal should be 
accepted as a basis for detailed study of this question. The latter should include the 
question of whether any machinery was required (either in the form of an Allied 
inspectorate or otherwise) for enforcing any restrictions which might be decided to 
impose on Rumania’s military establishment. The Council also accepted the British 
proposal about the withdrawal of Allied forces (with L/C with the Soviet zone of 
occupation in Austria) on September 21, 1945. The Foreign Ministers agreed to 
withdraw all Allied Forces from Bulgaria on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.*^  These 
decisions became the basic authority for the subsequent military discussions and the 
American formula was tacitly accepted as Covering also Hungary and Finland.
The Withdrawal of Allied Troops Versus the Recognition of 
Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments
It was evident after the London Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers that Italy 
would to some extent form a precedent for the other treaties. The British and Americans 
could not hope to get army restrictions imposed in the Balkan treaties if they had not
’ CFM (45) 36,35,40.
'"PROFO.CAB 133.
"  Ibid.
Ibid.
'^Ibid.
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gotten them for the Italian Treaty. Early on, it became evident that the Russians were 
reluctant to agree to changes in the Italian Treaty which might be used against their 
interests in the Balkans. This particularly applied to machinery for Treaty enforcement.*^
After the failure of the London session. Secretary of State James Byrnes initiated 
the continuation of peace talks in Moscow (December 15-27,1945). Bevin and Byrnes 
informally discussed the Southeast European situation as well. At these talks with 
Molotov, Bevin urged the withdrawal of all Allied troops from the Balkans and also the 
reduction of the Austrian occupation forces. At the same time, the British Foreign 
Secretary resisted the idea to withdraw their troops from Greece and considered that 
Bulgarian army with Soviet support represented a serious threat to their security interest.
Bevin wanted to obtain the demobilisation of the Bulgarian army, and the 
withdrawal of Allied troops from Hungary and Poland. Molotov reminded the Foreign 
Secretary that the Red Army had withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, and that the presence 
of the Red Army in these countries had in no way hampered the extension of popular 
will.
On December 23 1945, Stalin explained to Byrnes that Soviet troops did not 
exercise pressure on elections in the Balkan countries, for example “in Hungary there 
were Soviet troops and in actual fact the Soviet Union could do pretty much what it 
wanted there, but that nevertheless the elections had resulted in a victory for a party 
other than the Communist party. This demonstrates that the Soviet Union was exercising 
no pressure through its troops in the countries. All the Soviet Union asks of these border 
states in proximity to the Soviet Union was that they should not be hostile.”*®
Following this discussion, the three Foreign Ministers agreed that their 
governments should advise Rumanian King Michael that one member of the National 
Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the 
government. The Rumanian Government, thus reorganised, should declare that free 
elections will be held as soon as possible. A.I. Vyshinski, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark 
Kerr were authorised as a Commission to proceed immediately to Bucharest to execute 
the above-mentioned tasks. As soon as these were accomplished and the required 
assurances were received, the government of Rumania was recognised by the United 
States and the United Kingdom at the beginning of February 1946.
The Soviet Government took upon itself the mission of giving “friendly advice” to 
the Bulgarian Government with regard to the inclusion in the latter’s government of an 
additional two representatives from other democratic groups. After the failure of 
negotiating to broaden the Bulgarian Government, the recognition was postponed until 
after the peace talks.
The framework of the military clauses negotiations established at the Potsdam 
Conference and at the London and Moscow meetings, made the beginning of the expert 
discussions possible. The London Session of Deputies started work on the Military
Chief of Staff Comtniuee (C.O.S. (47)67). Report by the Service advisers to the United Kingdom 
delegation at the Paris Conference on the Peace Treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland on 
May 29,1947. (Hereafter Dove-Braithwaite report).
F.o. CAB 133. A conversation on 23rd December at the Kremlin between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr.
Byrnes.
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Clauses in January 1946. A few articles were adopted with little discussion, but it 
became evident that most of them would require expert examination and the Naval, 
Military and Air and Joint Sub-Committees were set up accordingly and the relevant 
clauses referred to them. Thereafter reference to the Deputies was only made when 
agreed articles were put to them for final confirmation, or when agreement could not be 
reached on the service level.
The Negotiations of the Military Clauses of the Balkan TVeaties in 1946*^
The discussion of the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian peace treaties started in 
March - April 1946 in the London Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Joint 
Committee of the military and air representatives negotiated the military clauses, and 
closely followed the Italian precedent.
The Deputy Foreign Ministers presented the first draft of the Rumanian Military 
Clauses on the 1st April 1946. The American proposal served on a basis for the 
limitation for the size of forces. The U.S. delegation wanted to reduce these forces to 
minimum level, still sufficient for the maintenance of order, local frontier defence and 
military contingents required by the UN Security Council. The British and American 
military representatives presented draft articles, but the Soviet delegation refused to 
accept the limitation of Rumanian forces. After May 7th, 1946 the shorter Soviet draft 
articles were taken as a basis for discussions. As compared to the Italian Military 
Clauses, the Soviets tried to obtain more lenient terms for Rumania and Bulgaria. The 
time limit for disbandment of excess forces, the prohibition of extraneous service 
training, the prohibition on excess war material, the disposal of excess war material, the 
duration of military limitations, the return of prisoners of war, the definition of military, 
air and naval training, the definition and list of war material in a shorter form, contained 
the same wording as in the Italian Peace Treaty.
The Soviet delegation wanted to avoid the numerical limitation of the Rumanian 
army. In the presentation of the armed forces of this country, the strength of the army 
was deliberately underestimated. The Americans pointed out that the Rumanian army’s 
size could not exceed the relative strength of Italian army in comparison to her 
population, but nevertheless taking into account that the Rumanian land frontiers were 
relatively longer than the Italian ones. The British delegation tried to obtain equal 
strength for the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian Armed forces. As a matter of 
general policy, the British side did not want to allow Bulgaria l^ger forces than the 
Greek army and tended to reduce the ceilings for the Balkan states to a minimum in 
order to avoid producing counter-arguments for the Soviet Union to cut down the Italian 
army.
The negotiation lasted a long time on the question of minimum requirements for
C.O.S. (47)67. Dove-Braithwaite Report. 
’^’Ibid.
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maintaining internal order and local defence of the frontiers. The American and British 
delegation succeeded to separate the limitation of anti-aircraft personnel from the army 
and frontier guards. The Soviets finally agreed to reduce the strength of Rumanian army 
by one third (compared to the estimate strength in the Spring of 1946) i.e. 120,000, and 
to 5,000 the anti aircraft personnel. These figures represented a compromise between the 
American (100,000), British (50-75,000) and Soviet (174,(X)0) proposals and created an 
important precedent for the negotiations of Bulgarian and Hungarian army limitations.
In the limitation of Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian air forces, the Soviet 
delegation argued to restrict these forces to the needs of defending local frontiers and 
the maintaining internal order. As the Soviet Union considered limiting the number of 
aircraft as superfluous, they required only a limitation of air force personnel. The British 
and American delegations compared the size of population, area of country, the number 
of vital centres to be defended between Italy and the Balkan countries and proposed the 
prohibition of bombers. In the discussions of the Rumanian case, the British attempted 
to reduce the air force to the minimum. They hoped to establish a precedent for Bulgaria, 
an all important issue for the protection of British interests in Greece.
At the end, the Soviet Union accepted a limit of 8000 men and 150 aircraft. The 
Naval discussions followed the same pattern. After discussions the Soviets agreed to 
limit the Rumanian Navy to 5(XX) men and 15,000 tons and accepted the British and 
American arguments to eliminate submarines torpedo-boats and special assault crafts.
The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian peace treaties omitted the restriction of 
some special weapons: the limitation 30 km -range guns and the abolition of motor 
torpedo boats that have been included in the Italian Treaty. In the first case, the 
American and British delegations accepted the Soviet argument that the Balkan 
countries had neither the engineering ability nor the capacity to make such guns. The 
motor torpedo boats, on a French initiative, were mentioned in the Italian Peace Treaty. 
At the Paris Conference, Italy and Greece both contested the absence of the prohibition 
of such special assault crafts in the Balkan treaties. The Soviet Union, after long 
discussions, finally accepted this amendment. The prohibition of atomic weapons, 
included at the Paris Conference, in the Italian Treaty, were applied to the other treaties 
as well.
The withdrawal of Allied forces (Article 21 of the Rumanian Peace Treaty) was the 
most important military clause which limited the sovereignty of this country. This 
question was neither mentioned in the British draft of the Italian Peace Treaty nor in the 
Soviet draft of the Rumanian and Hungarian peace treaties. The British intended to 
retain lines of communications through Italy to Austria so long as the British 
occupational forces remained in the latter country. At the September 1945 meeting of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers, agreement was reached that Allied forces would be 
withdrawn from Rumania, except for those needed for the Soviet lines of 
communications to Austria and would be withdrawn in toto from Bulgaria.
At the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation 
indicated that they might go back on their agreement over Bulgaria and leave troops 
ostensibly on a line of communication to Austria. Molotov linked the Soviet withdrawal 
from Bulgaria with the Allied troops withdrawal from Italy.
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In the ensuing discussions, the British pointed out that the British Zone in Austria 
had no connection with other British occupied territory, and that Bulgaria is not on the 
direct route to Austria from Soviet territory. The Americans, after this meeting, granted 
the necessary facilities to supply the British troops in Austria through the United States 
Zone in Germany. On 20th June 1946, the Soviet Foreign Minister finally gave up this 
position and agreed to Allied withdrawal within 90 days from both countries.
The military articles of the Bulgarian Treaty closely followed the corresponding 
articles of the Rumanian Treaty. The Great power agreed that the clauses of the Balkan 
and the Finnish peace treaties should be similar. The only differences concerned the 
Articles of the strength of the Bulgarian army, anti-aircraft personnel, air force, and 
navy, and the restrictions on Bulgarian frontier fortifications.
The application of the Rumanian precedent i.e., the reduction of army strength in the 
same proportion to the population as that of Rumania, resulted in a Bulgarian army of 
about 45,000. The British were anxious to limit Bulgarian forces well below those 
planned for Greece and argued that the forces allowed to them should bear a reasonable 
relation to their population, size, frontier and European status. The Soviet delegation 
insisted that no quantitative restrictions on the Balkan states and Finland were necessary. 
Molotov argued that relative to her population, Bulgaria had longer frontiers than 
Rumania and therefore needed a relatively larger army to defend them. The American and 
British delegations accepted to raise the strength of the Bulgarian army - including 
frontier guards - to 55,000. The British and American experts aimed to prevent Bulgaria 
from waging a war of aggression against Greece by assuring a modicum of goodwill from 
Bulgaria to implement the Military Clauses. They disregarded the fact that Bulgaria 
played a key role in the Soviet Mediterranean Strategy and never applied the initially 
planned reductions after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Bulgaria.
The drafting powers examined the sizes of the Bulgarian and Hungarian air forces 
together. The British and Americans contended that the Bulgarian and Rumanian air 
forces should bear the same relation to each other as did their armies. Only then did the 
Soviet delegation realise that their agreement over Rumania created a precedent and was 
going to make it difficult for them to secure what they regarded as an adequate air force 
for Bulgaria. They raised the figure to 5200 men and 90 aircraft from 5000 men and 52 
aircraft (5000 for Hungary), but the Soviet Senior Air Adviser, General Belov, had clear 
political instructions that Bulgaria was to receive better treatment than Hungary, and a 
larger air force than Greece. The Americans succeeded in reducing the number of 
B ulgarian combat aircraft to 70.
In the same way, unlike in the case of Rumania and Finland, the Soviets fought for 
six weeks in Paris over the size of the Bulgarian navy, for which they proposed a tonnage 
about ten times their pre-war strength. Finally a size half this figure was agreed upon.
At the Paris Conference (July 29th - October 15th, 1946) the Greeks sought to 
restrict Bulgarian frontier fortifications on the same wording as in the Italian Peace 
Treaty. A similar amendment to the Hungarian Treaty forwarded by Czechoslovakia had 
the Soviet support. The Americans and British reluctantly accepted the principle of 
limiting frontier fortifications. The Greeks at this moment introduced the question of 
frontier rectification.
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The linkage of these questions made it possible for the Americans to use the 
fortification issue as a consolation prize. The American and British delegations 
therefore argued that the great powers could not deny to a small ally (Greece) what they 
had already given to larger ones (France and Yugoslavia). The Soviet delegation 
contested this, stating that a small country (Bulgaria) could not be treated on the same 
basis as a large country (Italy). In the final session of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
(November 4th - December 12th, 1946), the Soviet delegation finally withdrew their 
objection to the proposed frontier rectifications.
The Greeks presented these claims to advance their frontier to the North for military 
considerations at the expense of Bulgaria in Macedonia and Thrace. At the instigation of 
the Soviets, the Bulgarians put in a counter-claim for part of Thrace, including the port 
of Dedeagach. The Americans opposed firmly both claims, and the British initially 
supported the Greek claim. The Military Commission of the Paris Conference implicitly 
recognised that the Greek frontier rectification proposal will not improve overall 
security of the region, only the possibilities of locd defence of that country. The 
Bulgarian political commission of the Paris Conference defeated the Greek proposal, 
and finally the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to refuse any frontier modification.
As mentioned, the negotiations of the Hungarian Military Clauses closely followed 
the Bulgarian model. The Soviet Union reduced the Hungarian army to 25,000 in 1945. 
In the discussions, the British tried to apply the principle of relating the size of the army 
to the population and proposed 70,000 men in order to exceed the size of Bulgarian 
army. The Americans moved for the number of 60,000 men. Surprisingly, the Soviets 
closed at 65,000, including anti-aircraft and river flotilla personnel. The strength of the 
Hungarian Air Force, as already described, was somewhat less than the Bulgarian Air 
Force.
Article 15 of the Hungarian Peace Treaty, as in the other Balkan and Finnish 
treaties, limited the special naval weapons. The report by the service advisers to the 
United Kingdom delegation. Brigadier A.J.H. Dove and Group-Captain F. J. Sr. G. 
Braithwaite explained the inclusion of this article in the following way:
“Odd though this may seem, since Hungary has no navy, it was not the result of 
careless drafting. The article is designed partly as a precaution to hinder German 
rearmament, as well as to restrict the forces of the ex-enemy country itself. 
Experimental work on torpedoes, special assault craft and small submarines can 
well be carried out on inland waters, such as Lake Balaton and submarines can be 
constructed in sections and moved by rail to a port for assembly. The references to 
naval weapons are thus of some value.”’*
The Implementation of the Military Clauses of the Peace Treaties 
with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary
At the moment of entry into force of the peace treaties, the Balkan countries started from 
different level of strength of the armed forces. The British Military estimated that
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Hungary had a 15,000 men army (including 7,000 Frontier Guards), 25,000 men in the 
security troops; Bulgaria 60 - 70,000 army, 10,000 frontier guards, 100,000 militia; and 
Rumania’s army strength attained 100,000 men, 20,000 frontier guards and 32.000 
gendarmerie. The British tried, in vain, to eliminate Soviet troops from Rumania and 
Hungary, concomitantly with the Anglo-American withdrawal from Italy on December 
15, 1947. They argued that there was no military justification for the Soviet position 
since the shortest and by far the most efficient means of communication between Russia 
and Austria lies along the railway route through Southern Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
The British and Americans failed to obtain a limitation on the number of Russian troops.
From the very beginning, the fulfilment of the Military Clauses of the Balkan 
Treaties was governed by Soviet wishes. The Soviet government defeated all efforts of 
the American and British to make the tripartite Minister’s Council (Article 39 of the 
Hungarian Peace Treaty, Article 37 of the Rumanian and Article 35 of the Bulgarian 
Treaties) an effective control body. The Soviets had entire responsibility for their 
unilateral actions, pursuing the build-up of their military alliance. The Americans and 
British were circumvented to ensure that the armed strengths officially maintained in 
these countries did not exceed limits laid down in the treaties, and kept themselves 
informed by undertaking inspections. In the case of Hungary and Rumania, the British 
and Americans also failed to ensure that the location of the Soviet troops would be 
limited to the Soviet lines of communications.
The Americans and British had no real lever to use against these governments and 
dropped the idea of bringing an effective case against Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, 
because they evaded treaty obligations with the Soviet support. Italy’s integration in the 
North Atlantic Alliance made it difficult to circumvent Soviet veto and obstruction. The 
ensuing violations are demonstrated by the history of the Hungarian implementation of the 
military articles. Most probably, Rumania and Bulgaria followed exactly the same pattern.
The Fulfillment of the Military and Aviational Clauses 
of the Hungarian Peace Treaty*^
With the signing of the Hungarian Peace Treaty and its parliamentary ratification the 
legal ground for the development of the Hungarian army was created, and the 
progressive establishment of the armed forces could begin. The Ministry of Defence 
wanted to create the 65,(XX) strong Hungarian army permitted by the Peace Treaty, 
through a long-run, well-considered development plan, keeping in mind the economic 
potential of the country. In the preparatory period of the development (1947-1951), the 
aim was to bring about the army’s training and educational frame, the new democratic 
professional officer and non-commissioned officer staff with high professional 
knowledge. At the end of preparatory period, the planned strength of the army would 
have reached 35,000 men.^ °
I would like to thank the contribution of Imre OkvSth (Research Fellow - Institute of Military History, 
Budapest).
^  Military History ArMvum (MHA). “Documents of the Supervisor of the Hungarian Army” (DSHA) 16. 
box, p. 141.
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The progressive build-up plan of the army changed from September 1947 due to the 
turns in foreign and home politics. Coming home from the session of the Cominform, 
MihMy Farkas and Jozsef Revai suggested in their memorandum to the PoUtical Committee 
of the Hungarian Communist Party -  among other things -  the revision of the views on the 
progressive establishment of the aimed forces. The new development plan (January 1948) -
- worked out mainly by the Communist Party -  thought that the size of the well trained, well 
equipped new army could be achieved in four years (1 October 1948-1 October 1952), The 
idea of exceeding the peace strength of65,000 first arose during the working out of the plan, 
because this number -  as a basis for mobilisation ~ was considered small. Taking into 
account Hungary’s population, the country could have been able to set up an army of 1 
million mobilised men. At a time of mobilisation -  taking into account the triplication of 
certain units -- the army of 1 million men could be achieved from an army of 300,000 men 
(the first step of mobilisation). To achieve this a peace strength of 100,000 would have been 
needed.^ *
From Spring 1949, the Hungarian political and military leadership -  in agreement 
with Stalin’s views on the international situation - considered American preparations for 
the third world war as the main reason for the progressive build up of the armed forces. It 
became the conviction of the Hungarian party leadership that in a few years the United 
States would start a war against the Soviet Union and the so-called people’s democracies. 
For this reason — in accordance with Soviet wishes — it decided to speed up the progressive 
build-up of the armed forces and lift the number and combat formations. As a major 
objective, it wished to reach a military potential needed to block the feared “imperialist” 
attack and be victorious, to establish a large mass army with conventional weapons. In 
order to achieve this, they charged the earlier development plan in such a way that these 
goals could be reached by the end of 1951
On the 16th of November 1949, the decision of the Cominform, which listed 
Yugoslavia among the aggressive imperialistic countries preparing for war, changed 
Hungarian military politics too. From this time on, the Hungarian army’s main task was to 
block a supposed attack coming from Yugoslavia and to organise a successful and effective 
counterattack. In the atmosphere of war psychosis - seeking to reach the needed mobili­
sation standard of the Hungarian army as soon as possible, the higher political-military 
leadership was not concemed with the military clauses of the Peace Treaty nor with 
keeping them.
Under the shadow of military confrontation, it was not in the interests of the great 
powers to check if there was strict compliance with the Peace Treaty. Moreover, it did not 
make sense to take sanctions against those countries that were their satellites; as for those 
countries that were not satellites, there was no possibility to do so. Thus, the possible non- 
compliance with the Peace Treaty clauses were, probably, implicitly understood.
For the first time, the Hungarian army violated the Peace Treaty in September/ 
October 1948 when it bought and set up 102 various aircraft from Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union^  ^(Point b., of Article 12. allowed 90 aircraft, 70 combat aircraft).
MHA. DSHA. 4. box, pp. 100-101.
“  MHA. Ministry of Defence (MD) Subdepartment for Equipment Planning (SEP) 1949. box 137. 
“  MHA. Symposium (S) II. - II/E-l/a p. 7.
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Article 14 was also disregarded. This Article forbids the military training of 
personnel not serving in the army and the military preliminary training. On the 19th of 
October 1948, the head of the training department of the Ministry of Defence informed 
the headquarters of the Hungarian army to start training outside the army. This happened 
through the militarily important (technical) sports, of which the directing branch 
became the technical department of the National Sport Office. With its leadership the 
technical sports were done through the Popular League of the Hungarian Youth and the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighters Alliance. Inside the Hungarian army matters in connection 
with these were dealt with by the Department of Training and Sports and Special Field 
Officers assigned to the regional commands.
In 1950, the Council of Ministers ordered universities and colleges and also party col­
lege training of outside troops in order to supply the needed amount of reserve officers.^ "* 
The allowed strength of the army was surpassed at the end of 1950 (87,900 men); 
and in 1952 they reached the largest strength of the army so far with 202,545 men. The 
strength of the Hungarian army between January 1953 and January 1956 moved from
120,000 to 186,000.^  ^ An important decrease came about after the 1956 October 
Revolution: the strength of the army at the beginning of the 1957 was around 88,000 
men.^  ^After the transitional period (1957-1960) and to developments started according 
to the needs of the Warsaw Treaty, the strength of the Hungarian army (1960-1990) was 
around 130-140,000 men. Today it is 105,000 men.
The authorised number of 5,000 was not kept either at the air force, since this was 
10-14,000 men between 1951-1956. The number of aircraft during this period varied 
from 2(X) to 5(X), including the prohibited bombers too.^ ^
In 1951 with the setting up of 12 M-13 (Katyusha) multiple rocket launchers within 
the 66th Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade, the specifications of the 15th Article were 
also disregarded. The brigade was reorganised in November 1953 — in accordance to the 
government programme of July 1953 — to a regiment and later, in the Autumn of 1954, 
it was requalified into a trench-mortar regiment under the 5th Motorised Rifle 
Division.^ * This type was concentrated into central stock in 1956 and later exported. A 
newer, theatre fire-power and larger range multiple rocket launcher, the BM-21, was 
introduced in the Hungarian People’s Army in 1969.^ ^
The medium range SZA-75 M (Dvina) air defence rocket system was set up in the 
air defence system in 1959 which was in service from the 19th May 1961.^ ° The MIG- 
19 type fighter of the air force was equipped with rockets also in this year.^ *
^  MHA. MD. Presidium (P) 2948.41728; MD Secretariat (S) 1951.1. box, p. 75.
25 MHA. 102/05/315.; MDP. 1949 - 303.314.
MHA. MD. SEP. 1957.187. box.
^  From 1953 there were 59 TU-2 medium bombers in the air force, see MHA. 102/05/315.
^  Keeping the 12 rocket-launchers.
MHA. S. II. 330/047/V.-5. p. 21 and p. 27-28.; IV/B-3/b. p. 46 and pp. 102-103. In 1970 there were 32 
BM-21; in 1973 and 1980 there were 66 of these.
^  MHA. S. II. IV/B-4 pp. 18-21.
MHA.S.II.II/E-l/a.p.89.
54 From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control ofDefeated States
The RPG-2 anti-tank rocket-launchers appeared at the motorised rifle units in 1960 
(6 in 1960; 1003 in 1965). The later model, the RPG-7 was put into service from 1965. 
This had an optical sight, longer penetrating power and larger reach.^  ^ The SZPG-9 D 
type platformed grenade launcher was introduced in 1966 (in 1970 177; in 1975 287; in 
1980269).”
Experiments were made from 1952 to work out ways for passive defence against an 
atomic attack. With the help of the Institute on Military Technique, a research group 
worked on a device with which the same effect could be achieved on a small area as on 
a larger one with an atomic bomb. The aim of the experiments was to obtain information 
for the organisation of defence against an atomic attack (what material should be used 
for shelters, how thick the walls should be and also measuring the level of radiation on 
the field, on machines, etc.).^ '*
By 1952, the Hungarian arms production provided small arms, artillery weapons 
and mortars and the optical and other artillery instruments needed for the Hungarian 
army including the mobilisation stocks. This meant violation of Article 16 which said 
that above the quantity needed for equipping an army of 65,000 men, Hungary is not 
allowed to keep or produce military equipment.
Finally it is possible to say that Hungary -  as a member of the Soviet led military 
alliance -  in order to prepare for war and to strengthen the military potential of the 
Hungarian army violated most of the military and aviational clauses of the Peace Treaty. 
This violation of the Treaty happened under the influence of the Soviet Union.
The implementation of the military clauses of the peace treaties became impossible 
because the establishment of Atiantic and Soviet alliances impeded from one side Italy, 
on the other side Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, to fulfil their obligations. The 
disunity of anti-fascist Allies led to the Cold War. The Soviet Union forced her small 
allies to violate the military clauses of the peace treaties. At the same time, the non­
conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty helped the Soviets to maintain an unlimited 
number of Soviet troops in Rumania and Hungary. The Americans and British had no 
possibility to control or enforce treaty -implementation. They upheld the entry of those 
countries in the United Nations until 1955, but they were forced to give up protests for 
the violation of human rights and military clauses, because the Soviets were in effective 
control.
The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian governments never tried to formally 
revise the military clauses of the peace treaties, even after the precedent created by the 
Finnish and Austrian diplomacy. The debate about the contents of the peace-treaties was 
“frozen” for decades. Only the dramatic changes in 1989-1992 in Central and Eastern 
Europe re-opened the question of the European peace settlement after the Second World 
War.
“ In 1965 1732; in 19701832; in 1975 1679; in 1980 1655.
MHA. S. II. IV/B-3/b. pp. 100-102.
^  MHA. MD. S. 1952.2. box, p. 196-197.
